National Archives releases papers that lay bare fraught private discussions over government’s stance on Maze prisoners

Owen Bowcott
Guardian
29 Dec 2011

A building in Belfast with a mural of Bobby Sands, one of the 10 hunger strikers who died during their campaign to secure political status for republican prisoners at the Maze. (Photograph: Eamonn Mccabe for the Guardian)

The Thatcher government wobbled in its resolution to resist the IRA’s Maze prison hunger strike and contemplated the “unpalatable” option of British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, according to secret cabinet documents.

The desperation of the government’s predicament during early July 1981 is revealed in files which show the prime minister negotiating directly with the republican leadership and considering whether compulsory “intravenous feeding” could be used to keep prisoners alive.

One letter, though unsigned, bears what must be Margaret Thatcher’s distinctive, handwritten alterations to the text of a message sent through an MI6-mediated “channel” of communication to the IRA.

Ten men, including Bobby Sands, died in their campaign to secure political status for republican prisoners. Seven were members of the IRA, three from the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).

While the government’s public stance at the time was defiance in the face of terrorist demands and a refusal to negotiate, behind the scenes an unusually, fraught tone is discernible in private discussions.

A “secret” cabinet paper marked “one copy only”, released to the National Archives in Kew, records an “informal discussion” at the end of a cabinet meeting on 2 July.

It noted “increasingly disturbing signs of an erosion of international confidence in British policy” towards the IRA hunger strike at the Maze prison outside Belfast. The government did not want to be portrayed as “inflexible”.

“Ideally some independent body should be invited to satisfy itself that the government’s attitude on the prison regime was both humane and reasonable,” it said. The European Commission for Human Rights had declined to play any role in the absence of any complaint.

“The government,” the cabinet note said, “could not, of course, make a complaint against themselves; the prisoners were not prepared to do so; and though another government could in theory fill in the gap it was questionable whether it would be wise to try to stimulate this.”

But it was the prospect of an intervention by the previous prime minister, James Callaghan, which caused most anxiety. “The difficulty of the government’s position seemed certain to be increased by the evolving opposition attitude towards Irish unity as an ultimate objective,” the document said.

It was thought Callaghan was about to make a speech proposing that Northern Ireland “should become independent, with transitional arrangements under which British troops and British financial assistance would remain available for a limited period.

“His [Callaghan’s] views might well receive massive support from public opinion in Britain, where there was already a widespread feeling in favour of British withdrawal,” it said.

The “watershed” had been passed once Sands was elected as an MP. “Many people in Britain now believed that a settlement of the complex problems of the area would be more easily reached by the Irish on their own and that continued British involvement could only mean the futile sacrifice of further British lives.”

But withdrawal was likely to result in “civil war and massive bloodshed”, with the Troubles spreading to British cities with significant Irish populations, the ministers present acknowledged.

The “guarantee to the province” was enshrined in statute and would need legislation. “The passage of this would be an occasion for turbulence as well as controversy. Even the suggestion of a withdrawal could lead to serious unrest in western Scotland.”

By then, four hunger strikers had already died. The immediate problem was how to prevent further deaths, so the cabinet discussion moved on to “compulsory feeding”.

“If done intravenously by modern methods,” it was proposed, “this should not involve the violent scenes associated with the forcible feeding of prisoners in the past.

“On the other hand, it was uncertain whether the prison doctors would be willing to co-operate; and if intravenous feeding led to all the protesting prisoners coming out on hunger strike, the authorities would be faced with the enormous task of sustaining by such methods indefinitely.” In the end, it was never tried.

The discussion ended with Thatcher summing up, saying “further thought would need to be given to all possible courses of action in regard to Northern Ireland, however difficult or unpalatable”.

Another prime ministerial file carries details of a message sent in secret on 6 July 1981 via MI6 to the leadership of the Provisional IRA in an attempt to negotiate a deal that would end the hunger strike.

The letter, sent to a businessman in Derry, Brendan Duddy, who was an intermediary, is headed “Message to be sent through the channel”. It sets out what the government would do “if, but only if” it was called off.

Prison uniforms would go and inmates could wear their own clothes “subject to approval of the prison governor”. Some of the list has been corrected in what appears to be the prime minister’s handwriting – the floating crossbars on the t’s and the not fully looped p’s are distinctive.

Her annotations seem not to have introduced any fresh concessions. The letter ends with the warning: “If the reply we receive is unsatisfactory and there is subsequently any public reference to this exchange we shall deny that it took place. Silence will be taken as an unsatisfactory reply.”

That the prime minister was directly involved is in no doubt. A memorandum to Thatcher from Humphrey Atkins, the Northern Ireland secretary, the following day refers to “the sending of the message which you approved last night”.

In the aftermath of the peace process, a bitter debate has opened up between mainstream provisional republicans and rival dissident factions over whether the hunger strike was deliberately prolonged by the leadership in order to build up political support for the movement.

Danny Morrison, one of the key provisional figures who went into the Maze that July, told the Guardian the documents vindicated the IRA’s decisions at the time. “I find these documents very refreshing,” he said. “At least they have published what was happening. These conversations were recorded by Michael Oatley [the MI6 officer] or his secretary. We never got the final [British] position [before hunger striker] Joe O’Donnell died.”

The negotiations did not succeed immediately and the hunger strike continued until October, when it finally ended.